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THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
AND PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES:
DRAWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINE
BETWEEN PERMISSIBLE AND
IMPERMISSIBLE SUPPORT OF RELIGIOUS
STUDENT GROUPS
James E. Mitchell*
INTRODUCTION
The framers of the Constitution almost certainly did not contem-
plate the ramifications the First Amendment's Establishment Clause
would have, centuries later, on the modern American public univer-
sity. But, thanks to the incorporation of the Bill of Rights, the Estab-
lishment Clause's prescription that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion"i applies with equal strength
to the states and their political subdivisions.2 One such subdivision, of
course, is the state-run university.
Consider the following hypothetical. A village is looking to build
a public community center on government property made up of ten
vacant lots. The mayor proposes the establishment of a public square,
consisting of a civic center, a courthouse, a hospital, a police station, a
grammar school, a secondary school, a community college, a Catholic
church, a Presbyterian church, and a temple for Reform Judaism.
The mayor's legal adviser, looking over the proposal, sees a possible
constitutional issue, as building three places of worship would seem-
ingly violate the Establishment Clause. "No, sir," replies the mayor,
"because the Establishment Clause only means that I have to be neu-
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A., Northwestern University,
2009. I would like to thank Professor Fernand Dutile for providing the inspiration for
this topic, as well as the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review for all of their invaluable
assistance.
1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2 See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (holding state govern-
ments to the command of the Establishment Clause).
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tral to religion, and that's exactly what I did. I didn't make all the
proposals religious. I have places that deal with civic involvement,
education, law enforcement, and a hospital. You can't say that I am
being partial, or that I'm favoring civics over religion, or vice versa.
I'm not being anything but neutral amongst the different religions,
too. Our town is approximately one-third Catholic, one-third Presby-
terian, and one-third Jewish, so I'm being neutral on that issue as
well."
While the mayor is undoubtedly correct in defending his propo-
sal as facially neutral, his lawyer is just as correct in spotting a constitu-
tional violation. If the Establishment Clause stands for one
proposition, it is that the government may not use public money to
fund a religious institution or place of worship.3 Given their status as
public entities, state universities are under the same Establishment
Clause proscriptions as state governments, and they may not directly
establish any church or religious institution. Of course, it would be
highly unlikely for a public university to establish an official, school-
sponsored religion. Religious student groups are, however, quite
common at American colleges.4 Their existence at state schools raises
the following constitutional question: To what extent may public uni-
versities support religious student groups without running afoul of the
Establishment Clause?
The Supreme Court's recent ruling in Christian Legal Society v.
Martinez5 suggests that there is a higher standard for religious groups
seeking monetary support from state universities than for those
merely seeking use of school facilities.6 While the standard for grant-
ing religious groups access to school facilities may be low,7 common
sense dictates that there should be a limit to this type of support, as no
one would realistically contend that any religious group could consti-
tutionally rent a public facility and transform it into a place of
worship.
3 See id. at 16 ("No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support
any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.").
4 For example, Penn State University, at its University Park campus, offers 58
"Religious/Spiritual" clubs, such as the Alliance Christian Fellowship, the Byzantine
Catholic Ministry, the Hindu Students Council, the Korean Buddhist Organization,
and the Muslim Student Organization. See Student Organization Directory, PENN ST.
UNION & STUDENT ACTIVITIES, http://www.sa.psu.edu/usa/studentactivities/search
results.asp?orgcat=Religious/Spiritual (last visited Sept. 24, 2011).
5 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
6 See id. at 2978-81, 2986.
7 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
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This Note attempts to discern that line between constitutional
and unconstitutional state support of religious student groups at pub-
lic universities. Part I describes four key cases composing the
Supreme Court's modern jurisprudence in this area. Part II analyzes
the Court's holding in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, and Part III
examines a case, recently decided by the Court of Appeals for the Sev-
enth Circuit, that directly addresses the question presented here.
Lastly, Part IV sets forth a standard for judging where university sup-
port of religious groups violates the Establishment Clause.
I. THE SUPREME COURT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
AND PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Any discussion of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence should begin with Lemon v. Kurtzman,8 the most canoni-
cal case regarding the Establishment Clause and public education. At
issue in Lemon were two state statutes prescribing government aid to
religious schools.9 In striking down the statutes as unconstitutional,
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, devised a three-pronged test
for ascertaining whether state support of religious institutions contra-
venes the Establishment Clause.10 The Lemon test is as follows: For a
statute to be permissible under the Establishment Clause, "[f]irst, the
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entangle-
ment with religion.""
In many modern Establishment Clause cases, the Court has
applied Lemon when determining the constitutionality of a given stat-
ute.' 2 Since its inception, however, the Lemon test has been slightly
recalibrated' 3 and criticized somewhat.14 Nevertheless, Lemon is still
8 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9 See id. at 606.
10 See id. at 612-13.
11 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
12 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314-16 (2000) (strik-
ing down a school-sponsored prayer at a football game, as the policy in support of the
invocation lacked a secular purpose); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248-53
(1990) (upholding the federal Equal Access Act under the Lemon standard).
13 The most notable instance of such recalibration arose in Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997). There, the Court reduced the "excessive entanglement" criterion to
only a factor to be considered in determining a statute's primary effect. See id. at
232-33.
14 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 719-20 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Lemon standard's broad guidelines have become "more
and more amorphous and distorted"); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free
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good law and therefore provides a helpful analytical backdrop for
examining the Establishment Clause concerns raised at public
universities.
A. Widmar v. Vincent
A decade after Lemon, the Court again examined the Establish-
ment Clause in Widmar v. Vincent.'5 There, the Court considered the
constitutional ability of a public university, having made its facilities
generally available to all registered student groups, to deny such
access to a registered religious group.'6  The Widmar plaintiffs
attended the University of Missouri and were members of Corner-
stone, a religious student group.17 After four years of granting Cor-
nerstone registered status, the University rescinded Cornerstone's
ability to conduct meetings on campus.' 8 The Supreme Court found
for Cornerstone, holding that, "[h]aving created a forum generally
open to student groups," the University could not "enforce a content-
based exclusion of religious speech."' 9
Writing for the Widmar majority, Justice Powell focused on the
"generally open" nature of the University's policy regarding access to
campus facilities. 20 Where a state university creates a generally open
forum, "[t]he Constitution forbids [it] to enforce certain exclusions
from [the] forum generally open to the public, even if it was not
required to create the forum in the first place."2 ' The Widmar Court
thus rejected the university's claimed interest in following the Estab-
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (characterizing the Lemon
test as "some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . frightening the little
children and school attorneys"); Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon: The
Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute's Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J.
351, 407 (2010) (describing how the Court's various approaches to ascertaining legis-
lative purpose under Lemon has produced inconsistent results).
15 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
16 See id. at 264-65.
17 See id. at 265.
18 See id.
19 Id. at 277.
20 See id. at 267. While Widmar characterizes the forum at issue as a "generally
open" one, later cases, including Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, modify the analysis.
When a university provides a forum to student groups, the forum created is a "limited
public forum." Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 n.12 (2010);
see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
21 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-68. In order to justify an exclusion of religious con-
tent from a generally open forum, the burden is on the state--or, as here, the public
university-to show that its exclusion is justified by a "compelling state interest." Id.
at 269-70.
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lishment Clause as a valid justification for excluding religious groups
from campus facilities.22
B. Lamb's Chapel
A dozen years after Widmar, the Court revisited many of the same
issues in a slightly different context in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District.2 3 Lamb's Chapel concerned a local school dis-
trict's refusal to grant a church's application to use school facilities to
present a religious film series.24 The church, Lamb's Chapel, had
applied to the school district for permission to present films that dealt
with family and child-rearing concerns from a Christian viewpoint.25
The district rejected Lamb's Chapel's request, invoking a school
board regulation that "'[t] he school premises shall not be used by any
group for religious purposes.'"26
Lamb's Chapel presented the question "whether it discriminates
on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the
presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except
those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint."27
Therefore, the Court considered the Free Speech Clause at issue, not
either of the Religion Clauses.28 The speech clause, according to the
Court, "forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor
some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."29 The Court,
22 See id. at 271. Accordingly, a university's interest in following the Establish-
ment Clause was not considered to have met the compelling state interest standard
necessary for exclusion. See id. But see Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L.
REv. 1263, 1267-68 (2008) (arguing that the government should be able to exclude
religious groups from receiving certain benefits, even where the Establishment Clause
does not require such an exclusion).
23 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
24 See id. at 387.
25 See id. at 387-88.
26 Id. at 387 (citation omitted).
27 Id. at 393. Implicit to this line of thinking is the premise that while the govern-
ment is creating a forum for speech, it is the private individual who is in fact speaking,
not the government. See Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establish-
ment Clause, 85 TUL. L. REv. 571, 573 (2011) (explaining how private speech in a
government forum implicates the Free Speech Clause, while government speech does
not).
28 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94.
29 Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). Viewpoint discrimination is
generally considered the primary evil the Free Speech Clause was meant to combat.
See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) ("A regulation of speech that is motivated by nothing more than a desire
to curtail expression of a particular point of view . .. is the purest example of a law
abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Leslie
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therefore, implicitly considered a dichotomy between free speech and
free exercise cases. Where a religious group aims to speak on a topic
that is not per se religious, such as child-rearing, from a viewpoint
informed by its religious faith, the implicated right is the right to free
speech.30 This rule suggests, conversely, that where speech or con-
duct is solely religious and does not relate to a secular matter, the Free
Exercise Clause is the constitutional guarantee implicated.3 1 Accord-
ingly, because the films at issue dealt with secular topics from a relig-
ious perspective,3 2 the Court decided the case under the Free Speech
Clause.3 3 Concluding that any nonreligious film series on family and
child-rearing would be allowed under the school district's policy, and
that the only reason given for the district's rejection of the Lamb's
Chapel application was the films' religious nature, the Court held the
denial of the church's application to be unconstitutional viewpoint
discrimination. 34
The Court did consider the effect of the Establishment Clause on
the public school's provision of access to the church, but it considered
Widmar wholly controlling on this point.3 5 As in Widmar, the Court
found "the posited fears of an Establishment Clause violation," posed
by allowing the church group access to school facilities, to be
"unfounded."3 6 Because the school district property was open to a
variety of groups, religious and nonreligious, the Court saw little
chance that anyone could have concluded the state was sponsoring
the religious message at issue. Echoing Widmar, the Court decided
that such a fear was baseless, given the myriad of student groups pro-
vided with access to university facilities.37
Gielow Jacobs, Clanfying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determi-
nations, 34 McGEORGE L. REV. 595, 600-01 (2003) (describing viewpoint discrimina-
tion as "the primary free speech clause danger," which the government "can almost
never justify").
30 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393-94.
31 Cf Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 794
(1997) (discussing how many commentators reject attempts to equate religion to
speech and thus consider religious belief its own substantive category).
32 See Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 388 n.3 (describing the film series, which
addressed such secular topics as fatherhood, relationships, adolescence, abortion,
pornography, and alcoholism).
33 See id. at 393-94.
34 See id. at 394.
35 See id. at 395.
36 Id.
37 See id. Creating the perception of state sponsorship or endorsement of relig-
ion is commonly considered an Establishment Clause violation. See Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that a public school violated the Establishment
Clause when it arranged for a religious prayer to be said at graduation ceremonies, as
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C. Rosenberger v. University of Virginia
Both Widmar and Lamb's Chapel dealt exclusively with the provi-
sion of state facilities-physical, tangible space-to religious student
groups. A couple of years after Lamb's Chapel, in Rosenberger v. Rector
& Visitors of University of Virginia,38 the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a public university's monetary support of religious
groups. 9 At issue in Rosenberger was a request by a religious student
group at the University of Virginia for reimbursement of the printing
costs of a campus magazine. 40 The University regularly reimbursed
student groups with money from the Student Activities Fund (SAF),
an account compiled from a mandatory student fee. 41
The editors of "Wide Awake: A Christian Perspective at the Uni-
versity of Virginia" described the contested publication as "offer [ing]
a Christian perspective on both personal and community issues."42
The magazine presented traditional Christian prayer and imagery,43
as well as articles addressing secular student concerns, such as racism,
stress, and eating disorders. 44 The school ultimately rejected Wide
Awake Productions' (WAP) request for reimbursement. 4 5 The Uni-
versity based its conclusion on a provision of the SAF policy prescrib-
ing that money from the fund may be used to support "news" or
"media" student groups, but not to support "religious activities."4 6
The Court's holding in Rosenberger was two-fold. First, it held that
the University violated WAP's constitutionally protected free speech
the school's actions constituted "a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exer-
cise"); infra note 164 and accompanying text.
38 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
39 See id. at 822-23.
40 See id. at 827.
41 See id. at 824.
42 Id. at 826 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
43 See id. The editors of Wide Awake "committed the paper to a two-fold mission:
'to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the faith they pro-
claim and encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with Jesus
Christ means.'" Id. (citation omitted). Additionally, each page of the magazine, as
well as the end of every article, was marked with a traditional Christian cross. See id.
44 See id. This latter type of material in Wide Awake evokes the Lamb's Chapel
standard of speech "from a religious perspective" that is protected under the Free-
dom of Speech Clause. See Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 394 (1995).
45 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 827.
46 See id. at 825 (defining "religious activity" as "any activity that 'primarily pro-
motes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an ultimate reality'"
(citation omitted)).
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right when it refused to make the reimbursement. 47 The Court made
two necessary logical steps to reach this result.4 8 First, the Court
extended the open-access rationale of Widmar and Lamb's Chapel to
the provision of monetary funding.49 "The SAF is a forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense," wrote Justice Ken-
nedy for the majority, "but the same principles are applicable."5 0 By
characterizing the question of monetary support as rather one of
equal access, the Court reformatted the issue presented in Rosenberger
into a more standard constitutional question.
The majority's second analytical step involved the characteriza-
tion of the Wide Awake publication as analogous to the film series in
Lamb's Chapel: speech on a secular subject from a religious viewpoint.
The Court considered the University's exclusion of WAP from the SAF
to be based on the group's viewpoint, rather than the substance of the
group's speech.5 1 This classification was determinative for the pur-
poses of the Court's free speech analysis, given the diverging legal
standards for viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination:
Viewpoint discrimination is per se unconstitutional in a limited public
forum, while discrimination based on a speaker's content is permissi-
47 See id. at 837.
48 The phrase "logical steps" is putting it quite mildly. As Justice Souter's dissent
makes clear, the majority's analysis is problematic in two respects. Characterizing the
SAF as a forum equivalent to the campus facilities in Widmaror the school building in
Lamb's Chapel ignores one of the central tenets of the Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence-namely, that "[u]sing public funds for the direct subsidization of
preaching the word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause." Id. at
868 (Souter,J., dissenting). Secondly, the majority's characterization of the nature of
the magazine as one that is merely from a "religious viewpoint" understates the level
of proselytizing and religion invocation contained in the magazine. See id. at 865-68.
"Each issue of Wide Awake," Justice Souter opines, "echoes [St. Paul's] call to accept
salvation." Id. at 865. Even articles on seemingly secular topics-such as the all-too-
common problem of eating disorders, which undoubtedly pervades both public uni-
versities and private religious ones-contain religious commands and adulations.
"Christ is the Bread of Life (John 6:35). Through him, we are full. He alone can
provide the ultimate source of spiritual fulfillment which permeates the emotional,
psychological, and physical dimensions of our lives." Id. at 867. The Court's ques-
tionable classification, of course, allows the majority to view the University's exclusion
as per se impermissible viewpoint discrimination. See id. at 837 (majority opinion).
49 See id. at 830.
50 Id. As in Lamb's Chapel, the forum created here constituted a limited public
forum. See id. at 829-30.
51 See id. at 830-31. But see Robert L. Waring, Wide Awake or Half-Asleep? Revela-
tions from Juisprudential Tailings Found in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 17 N.
ILL. U. L. REv. 223, 234 (1997) (criticizing Justice Kennedy's opinion in Rosenbergerfor
its expansive interpretation of the viewpoint discrimination doctrine in order to fit
the facts of the case).
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ble if it is reasonable in light of the state's interest in creating the
forum.5 2 By classifying Wide Awake's content as religious in viewpoint
rather than in substance, the Court concluded, as a logical conse-
quence, that "the University does not exclude religion as a subject
matter but selects for disfavored treatment those student journalistic
efforts with religious editorial viewpoints."53 Therefore, the University
was engaging in viewpoint discrimination when it barred WAP from
receiving monetary support that was available to nonreligious
groups. 54
This determination did not end the Rosenberger Court's inquiry, as
it still had to decide whether the University's viewpoint discrimination
was permissible in light of the school's interest in obeying the Estab-
lishment Clause.55 In holding that the Establishment Clause did not
excuse the denial of WAP's application for SAF funding, the Court
construed the Establishment Clause as requiring "neutrality towards
religion."5 6 A university fund for student clubs that distributed money
on an impartial basis-not distinguishing between religious and non-
religious groups-would meet such a standard of neutrality.57
D. Good News Club v. Milford
At first blush, the holding in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School58 seems unsurprising in light of prior case law. The plaintiffs in
Good News Club were sponsors of a private Christian organization
whose aim was to provide after-school religious instruction for chil-
dren.5 9 Once the school denied the organization's request to be
52 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829-30; see also Aaron H. Caplan, Invasion of the
Public Forum Doctrine, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 647, 651-52 (2010) (cataloguing exam-
ples of permissible instances of content discrimination).
53 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831.
54 See id. at 837.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 839. The Court found this "guaranty of neutrality [to be] respected, not
offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies,
extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious
ones, are broad and diverse." Id. Looking at the Establishment Clause as command-
ing government neutrality switches the focal point of the analysis from the character
of the government action to the effect on the individual. See Patrick M. Garry, An
Equal Protection View of the First Amendment, 28 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 787, 815 (2010)
(characterizing the neutrality approach as an analogue to the Court's equal protec-
tion jurisprudence, wherein individuals have the right to be free from government
discrimination).
57 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840.
58 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
59 See id. at 103.
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allowed to have weekly meetings in the school cafeteria after school
hours, the plaintiffs challenged the denial as a violation of their free
speech rights.6 0 The Court, relying primarily on Lamb's Chapel and
Rosenberger, held that the school's exclusion of the club from the lim-
ited public forum it had created constituted impermissible viewpoint
discrimination, 6 1 and that the Establishment Clause did not excuse
such a violation.62
Despite this seemingly routine application of precedent, the dia-
metrically opposed interpretations of the religious activities at the
heart of Good News Club are of greater import. Both the District Court
for the Northern District of New York and the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit upheld the school's rejection of the Good News
Club's application.6 3 The District Court determined that, as the club's
"subject matter is decidedly religious in nature, and not merely a dis-
cussion of secular matters from a religious perspective that is other-
wise permitted under [the school's] use policies," 6 4 the club's
exclusion was not unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 65 The
Court of Appeals, likewise, did not view the content of the Good News
Club's speech as secular speech delivered from a religious viewpoint,
but rather as "quintessentially religious" material "fall [ing] outside the
bounds of pure moral and character development."66
The dissents of Justice Stevens and Justice Souter also treat the
content of the religious meetings at issue as inherently different from
speech made from a religious perspective. Justice Stevens's dissent
compartmentalizes this type of speech, embodied by the Lamb's Chapel
film series, as only one of three distinct categories of religious
speech.67 The other types, according to Justice Stevens, are "religious
60 See id. at 103-04.
61 See id. at 111-12.
62 See id. at 119.
63 See id. at 104-05.
64 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 154 (N.D.N.Y.
1998).
65 See id. at 160.
66 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510-11 (2d Cir. 2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
67 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Of course, there is
scholarly disagreement with the premise that religious speech can be compartmental-
ized into distinct categories. See, e.g., Norman T. Deutsch, May Religious Worship Be
Excluded From a Limited Public Forum? Commentary on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
Decision in Faith Center Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 31 U. HAW. L. REV.
29, 50 (2008) (arguing that, as "much of religious worship in fact involves verbalized
points of view," religious belief cannot be adequately considered conceptually sepa-
rate from other viewpoints). Further, the idea that different types of religious speech
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speech that amounts to worship" and speech "aimed principally at
proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith."68
According to Justice Stevens, a state should be able to exclude speak-
ers engaging in the latter two types of speech from a limited public
forum, while leaving it open to groups engaging in the first type of
Lamb's Chapel speech.69
Justice Souter's dissent gives considerable attention to the evan-
gelical nature of the Good News Club's meetings. Citing the findings
of the District Court, Justice Souter recounts a sample meeting of the
club where "children [were] instructed that [t]he Bible tells us how
we can have our sins forgiven by receiving the Lord Jesus Christ. It
tells us how to live to please Him."70 Additionally, the leaders of the
club would frequently give separate instruction to "unsaved" children
in order that they could be "saved."71 Justice Souter thus argued that,
as the meetings were clear attempts at religious instruction and con-
version and not merely discussion from a Christian perspective, the
district engaged in permissible content discrimination when it
excluded the club from meeting at the school.72
Despite this uniformity of decision, the majority in Good News
Club did not consider the meetings at issue to be any different from
the contested speech in Lamb's ChapeL73 Because the school district's
policy regarding after-school use permitted discussion of "the develop-
ment of character and morals from a religious perspective," and
because it was "clear that the Club teaches morals and character devel-
are cognizable has never commanded a majority of the Court. See Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 270 n.6 (1981) (rejecting the distinction between religious worship and
speech from a religious point of view).
68 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 130 (StevensJ., dissenting). To illustrate that such
categories of speech can be coherently compartmentalized, Justice Stevens made an
analogy to different types of political speech. According to Justice Stevens, "just as a
school may allow meetings to discuss current events from a political perspective with-
out also allowing organized political recruitment, so too can a school allow discussion
of topics such as moral development from a religious (or nonreligious) perspective
without thereby opening its forum to religious proselytizing or worship." Id. at 132.
69 See id. at 131-33.
70 Id. at 137 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 See id. at 137-38. Such unabashed proselytizing certainly appears to go beyond
speech informed by a religious perspective. For an argument describing how the
Court's holding in Good News Club ignores the coercive effects of such speech on
schoolchildren and accordingly constitutes more than mere speech from a religious
viewpoint, see Steven K. Green, All Things Not Being Equal: Reconciling Student Religious
Expression in the Public Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 843, 870-71 (2009).
72 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 134-36 (Souter, J., dissenting).
73 See id. at 108-10 (majority opinion).
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opment to children . .. even if it does so in a nonsecular way," 7 4 the
Court "[found] it quite clear that [the school district] engaged in
viewpoint discrimination when it excluded the Club from the after-
school forum."75 Additionally, the Court found that permitting the
club to meet at the school was consistent with the Establishment
Clause, which it viewed as requiring neutrality between religion and
nonreligion.76 Thus, the Good News Club Court held that, far from
requiring the exclusion of the religious group from school facilities,
the Establishment Clause encouraged, or perhaps even required, the
school grant the club access.77
II. CHRISTLN LEGAL SocIETY V. MARTINEZ
In all four of the previously discussed Established Clause cases,
the Supreme Court found for the complaining religious group and
against the law or school policy denying the group a benefit. Further,
in both Rosenberger and Good News Club, the Court construed the Estab-
lishment Clause as requiring neutrality to, not separation from, relig-
ion.78 This trend in the modern Court's jurisprudence resembles the
theory of government accommodation of religion, which has been
74 Id. at 108.
75 Id. at 109.
76 See id. at 114.
77 See id. ("The Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally
and given access to speak about the same topics as are other groups.. .. [The school
district] faces an uphill battle in arguing that the Establishment Clause compels it to
exclude the Good News Club."). The divide between those that believe the First
Amendment prohibits government aid to religion and those who believe such aid is
constitutionally required reflects the expansive gulf between the various methodologi-
cal approaches to the Establishment Clause. Compare Tebbe, supra note 22, at 1271
(arguing that government exclusion of religion is constitutional and justifiable
because, "[wihen the government singles out religious actors and entities for denials
of support, it frequently leaves them just as free to observe their faith as they were
before the government program existed"), with Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom
Deseroes More Than Neutrality: The Constitutional Argument For Nonpreferential Favoritism of
Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 1 (2005) (criticizing the neutrality approach for failing to
adhere to the broad, pro-religion original understanding of the Establishment Clause,
and claiming that government preferential treatment of religion is constitutional).
78 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-14; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839-40 (1995); Edward Rubin, Assisted Suicide, Morality, and
Law: Why Prohibiting Assisted Suicide Violates the Establishment Clause, 63 VAND. L. REV.
763, 785 (2010) (explaining how the neutrality approach to the Establishment Clause
"forbids government from favoring one religion over another, but is distinguishable
from strict separation . . . because it also forbids the government from favoring secu-
larism over religion").
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promoted by the Court's more conservative members.79 However, the
religious accommodation approach has its limits, as evidenced by the
Court's decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez. 0
The University of California Hastings College of the Law ("Has-
tings") offers student groups, through its Registered Student Organi-
zation (RSO) program, the ability to obtain school-approved status.
Becoming registered under the RSO entitles groups to a number of
benefits, including the ability to seek monetary support, place
announcements in weekly school newsletters, advertise on bulletin
boards, and apply for permission to use the school's facilities for meet-
ing space.81 The law school conditions RSO status on a nondiscrimi-
nation policy that obliges all registered groups to "allow any student to
participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the
organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs." 8 2 Essentially, for a
student group at Hastings to receive school sponsorship and monetary
support, it must permit any interested student into the group.83
The plaintiff-petitioners in Martinez were members of a student
chapter of the national Christian Legal Society (CLS) .84 The group at
Hastings, in accordance with the national organization's require-
ments, requires all student members to sign a "Statement of Faith"
and to pledge to follow certain Christian principles.85 The Hastings
79 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505. U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[T]he longstanding American tradition of prayer at official ceremonies displays
with unmistakable clarity that the Establishment Clause does not forbid the govern-
ment to accommodate it."); see also CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER,
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 95 (2007) (describing the religious
accommodation theory as one asserting that religious "groups and individuals are
entitled to be free from discrimination on the basis of the spiritual foundations of
their [beliefs]"); S. Ezra Winn, Recent Developments: Constitutional Law-First Amend-
ment-Religious Activities in State Universities, 49 TENN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1982) (demon-
strating the accommodation-oriented notion that "the denial of . . . incidental
benefits would make government the adversary of religion in contradiction to the
command of neutrality set forth in the Establishment Clause").
80 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010).
81 See id. at 2979.
82 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
83 See id. at 2979-80. The challenging student group in the case contended that
the relevant Hastings policy was merely one of nondiscrimination, rather than the all-
comers policy which the school adopted, according to the group, only after the school
rejected the group's application. See id. at 2982. For the purposes of this Note, it is
enough to say that the Court, after a detailed discussion, accepted the trial court's
finding that the policy at issue was the all-comers policy. See id. at 2982-84.
84 See id. at 2980.
85 See id. For the national Christian Legal Society's full Statement of Faith, which
does not require exclusion of homosexual persons, see Statement of Faith, CHRISTIAN
LEGAL Soc'Y, http://www.clsnet.org/page.aspx?pid= 3 6
7 (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
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chapter interpreted this requirement as excluding from membership
any person who practices "unrepentant homosexual conduct," as well
as any person "holdling] religious convictions different from those in
the Statement of Faith."8 6 The Hastings administration, having deter-
mined that CLS discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation and
religion, rejected the group's application for RSO status.8 7 Neverthe-
less, the school agreed to provide CLS with access to Hastings facilities
for the purposes of meetings and activities, as well as access to school
chalkboards and bulletin boards.88 Consequently, the primary depri-
vation suffered by CLS was exclusion from the money allocated to
school-sponsored RSOs.8 9
A divided Supreme Court upheld Hastings' all-comers policy.90
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the majority, asserted that the limited
public forum analysis of Lamb's Chapel, Rosenberger, and Good News Club
was the correctjudicial yardstick for measuring the policy's validity, as
Hastings had created such a forum through its RSO program.9' The
Court deemed the policy constitutional, as it was both reasonable 92
and viewpoint neutral.93 The Court distinguished Widmar and Rosen-
berger as cases where the challenged university policy disfavored cer-
tain groups on the basis of their religious character. 9 4 Here, by
contrast, Hastings did not draw distinctions based on the content of
CLS's speech or its religious affiliation, but rather applied the all-com-
86 Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2980 (citation omitted).
87 See id.
88 See id. at 2981.
89 See id. at 2979-81.
90 See id. at 2995.
91 See id. at 2984 & n.12.
92 See id. at 2989-93. In the Court's reasonability analysis, Justice Ginsburg high-
lighted a number of justifications advanced by Hastings for its all-comers policy. An
all-inclusive policy for student groups, the school argued and the Court accepted,
would provide all students with equal access to the social and educational opportuni-
ties offered by such groups; it would ensure that no student would be forced to fund,
through the mandatory student activities fee, a student group that he or she would
not be able to join; it would encourage toleration and cooperation between students;
and it would reflect the school's decision not to subsidize discriminatory conduct. See
id. at 2989-91.
93 See id. at 2993-94. The Court found it "hard to imagine a more viewpoint-
neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers." Id. at
2993. But seeJack Willems, The Loss ofFreedom of Association in Christian Legal Society
v. Martinez, 130 S.Ct. 2971 (2010), 34 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 805, 815 (2011) (assert-
ing that Hastings's all-comers policy infringed on the right of CLS to express its view-
point via the membership requirements at issue).
94 See Martinez, 130 S.Ct. at 2987-88; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of
Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981).
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ers policy to all organizations seeking RSO status.9 5 While the Court
acknowledged that such a policy would likely have a greater effect on
some groups than others-i.e., a greater effect on religious groups
than nonreligious ones-the Court deemed such a burden merely
incidental.96 CLS's argument that the policy discriminated against the
group on the basis of the members' religious viewpoint was therefore
unavailing, as the Court concluded that the policy targeted the act of
exclusion itself, rather than the religious beliefs motivating the
exclusion.9 7
Additionally, the Court gave special credence to the fact that CLS
was not barred from access to the school's facilities.98 Despite its lack
of RSO status, CLS was still permitted to meet, advertise, and host
activities at the school.99 This level of access informed the Court's
conclusion that the all-comers policy was a reasonable one. 00 The
Court reasoned that "when access barriers are viewpoint neutral, [it is
constitutionally] significant that other available avenues for the group
to exercise its First Amendment rights lessen the burden created by
those barriers."10 Concluding that what CLS was seeking was "effec-
95 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2993.
96 See id. at 2994 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)
("A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed
neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not
others.")); see alsoJulie A. Nice, How Equality Constitutes Liberty: The Alignment of CLS v.
Martinez, 38 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 666-67 (2011) (comparing the Court's ten-
dency to permit incidental effects on associational freedom to its Equal Protection
jurisprudence, where the "Court refuses to apply higher scrutiny unless the Court is
persuaded that the government's discrimination is intentional"). But see William E.
Thro & Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications ofChristian Legal
Society v. Martinez, 261 EDuc. L. REP. 473, 485 (2010) (arguing that denying groups
access to limited public forums will have an unduly burdensome effect on their free-
dom of expression).
97 See Martinez, 130 S. Ct. at 2994. The Court here suggests a dichotomy between
religious belief, which may not be regulated, and action upon that religious belief,
which may be. The Court has recognized such a distinction in the past, but the view
does have its critics. Compare Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
73-74 (1977) (describing how, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, an employer
may permissibly fail to accommodate an employee's religious practice if such an
accommodation would pose an undue hardship, but may never discriminate on the
basis of belief), with Willems, supra note 93, at 817 (arguing that limiting the ability of
a group like CLS to set membership criteria is, in itself, a form of viewpoint
discrimination).
98 See Martinez, 130 S.Ct. at 2986, 2991.
99 See id. at 2981, 2991.
100 See id. at 2991.
101 Id.
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tively a state subsidy," 0 2 it was not unreasonable to exclude CLS from
the monetary benefits of RSO status while still allowing the group
equal access to the school's facilities.103
III. THE SOUTHWORTH SAGA
The Widmar-Lamb's Chapel-Rosenberger-Good News Club quartet of
cases, alongside Martinez, provides the major precedent governing
universities and religious student groups. An examination of Badger
Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, reveals the inconsistencies in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence in this area of the law. The rest of this Note will
attempt to elucidate a new standard, post-Martinez, for evaluating
Establishment Clause cases at public universities.
A. Board of Regents v. Southworth
In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. South-
worth, 04 the Court considered the constitutionality of the University
of Wisconsin's mandatory student activity fee.'05 Students at the uni-
versity challenged the fee on First Amendment grounds, claiming that
the imposition of a fee used to support "political or ideological" stu-
dent groups violated their free speech and free exercise rights.106 The
Southworth Court rejected the claim, holding: "[T]he First Amend-
ment permits a public university to charge its students an activity fee
used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if
the program is viewpoint neutral."' 07 The Court reasoned that the
university's levying of a mandatory activities fee did implicate the stu-
dents' free speech rights, but nevertheless it found the fee constitu-
tional. As long as the university allocated the funds drawn from the
fee on a viewpoint-neutral basis, the Court considered the students'
constitutional rights to be sufficiently protected. 08
102 Id. at 2986.
103 See id. at 2991-92. But see Thro & Russo, supra note 96, at 484 (arguing that
"[r]estricting the freedom of association as a condition of accessing a limited public
forum violates the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions," which posits that the gov-
ernment may not deprive an individual of a constitutional right in exchange for a
benefit).
104 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
105 See id. at 221.
106 See id. at 227.
107 Id. at 221.
108 See id. at 233.
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B. Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh
While the outcome reached in Southworth was unambiguous-all
nine Justices agreed that the university's activities fee was constitu-
tional' 09-the University of Wisconsin controversy did not end there.
With the ruling in hand to allocate the funds on a viewpoint-neutral
basis, the school rejected an application from a religious student
group named Badger Catholic.110 The university's policy provided
that " [i] t [was] willing to use student activity fees for . .. dialog, discus-
sion, or debate from a religious perspective, but not for anything that
it labels worship, proselytizing, or religious instruction.""' While the
university funded a number of Badger Catholic programs under the
"religious perspective" prong of its policy, 12 it refused to fund the
group's more sectarian activities, such as spiritual appointments with
clergy members and a summer retreat involving masses and commu-
nal prayer sessions." 3 Upon Badger Catholic's challenge, the District
Court for the Western District of Wisconsin entered a declaratory
judgment in the group's favor, holding that the university had to
reimburse Badger Catholic for the cost of the activities at issue.' 14
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding
that the viewpoint-neutral allocation of money for Badger Catholic's
religious activities would not violate the Establishment Clause."' 5 By
refusing to allocate funds for Badger Catholic's "prayer" and "secta-
rian instruction," the university had engaged in impermissible view-
point discrimination. 1 6 The university could not bar the group from
access to money from the activities fund because, " [o] nce it creates a
public forum, a university must accept all comers within the forum's
scope."" 7
109 See id. at 219. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, con-
curred with the Court's finding the student activities fee constitutional. See id. at 236
(Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter would not have found the viewpoint-neutral
allocation of the funds derived from the activities fee to have been determinative;
rather, he would have rested the holding on the lack of a sufficient First Amendment
interest on behalf of the protesting students. See id.
110 See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 776 (7th Cir. 2010).
111 Id. at 777.
112 The University, in fact, allocated nine percent of the entire fund derived from
the activities fee to Badger Catholic. See id. at 783 (Williams, J., dissenting).
113 See id. at 777 (majority opinion).
114 Roman Catholic Found., UW-Madison, Inc. v. Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 578
F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wis. 2008).
115 See Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 778.
116 See id. at 781.
117 Id. at 780.
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The Badger Catholic court consciously withheld from deciding the
case until the Supreme Court decided Martinez.'18 The panel found
Martinez controlling, declaring that "[t]here can be no doubt after
Christian Legal Society that the University's activity-fee fund must cover
Badger Catholic's six contested programs, if similar programs that
espouse a secular perspective are reimbursed."' 19 Further, it relied on
the Supreme Court's characterization of Widmar as "a case holding
that refusing to allow 'religious worship and discussion' in a public
forum is forbidden viewpoint discrimination."12 0 Relying on these
precedents, the panel had little difficulty striking down the univer-
sity's withholding of funds from Badger Catholic.121
C. Judge Williams's Dissent
Judge Williams of the Seventh Circuit dissented in Badger Catholic,
as she viewed the University's decision to financially support student
groups engaging in speech from a religious viewpoint, but to withhold
support for activities constituting "pure religious practice," 122 as con-
stitutionally permissible. 2 3 Because Judge Williams's dissent applied
the Supreme Court's limited public forum analysis from Martinez and
drew a constitutionally legitimate line between speech from a relig-
ious viewpoint and speech or conduct that is wholly religious in char-
acter, the reasoning of her dissent should be adopted over that of the
Badger Catholic panel.
Judge Williams's dissent properly characterizes the student activi-
ties fund as a limited public forum, rather than a generally open
one.124 This classification follows Martinez, where the Court character-
ized Hastings's RSO fund as a limited public forum.125 Thus, the
panel in Badger Catholic erred in calling the university's activities fund
a generally open "public forum,"' 2 6 rather than a limited one.1 27 Fol-
118 See id. at 781.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 See id. at 777-78.
122 Id. at 787 (Williams, J., dissenting).
123 See id. at 783.
124 See id.
125 See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2984 & n.12 (2010).
126 Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 777 (majority opinion).
127 In fact, the panel for the majority in Badger Catholic does not mention the
phrase "limited public forum" a single time. See id. at 775-82; see also David A.
Thomas, Whither the Public Forum Doctrine: Has This Creature of the Courts Outlived Its
Usefulness?, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EsT. L.J. 637, 685-86 (2010) (listing locales the Court
has defined as limited public forums, including a conference room in a public library
and a local community center).
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lowing the Court's limited public forum doctrine, viewpoint discrimi-
nation by the University of Wisconsin is unconstitutional, while
content discrimination is permissible as long as such discrimination is
reasonable.128
With this distinction in mind, the question becomes whether
Badger Catholic's activities that are "mostly worship, proselytizing or
prayer"129 more greatly resemble speech on a secular topic from a
religious point of view-in which case, the university's rejection of
support would be impermissible-or rather a unique, nonsecular cate-
gory of speech that the university could justifiably exclude from its
limited forum. The majority in Badger Catholic failed to see such a
distinction, as it considered all of the student group's activities, no
matter how sectarian, to be religious speech protected by the princi-
ple of viewpoint neutrality.o30 This broad conception of religious
speech, however, is not consistent with the principles of viewpoint and
content discrimination and, more generally, the distinction between
the Free Speech Clause and the Religion Clauses.
The viewpoint-neutrality doctrine requires the state to allow all
views be heard on a subject if the state has already permitted some
views on that subject be heard. For example, if a school allowed a
group of Lady Gaga fans to rent the school gymnasium for a meeting
of their fan club, the school could not then deny a corresponding
application from an anti-Gaga group. To frame the hypothetical in
slightly more relevant terms, if a school had opened its doors to the
Lady Gaga fan club, the school could not then reject a religious
group, whose religious convictions animated a disapproval of Gaga,
from meeting in that same forum. No matter how religiously moti-
vated the group's anti-Gaga animus were, the group would still be
allowed to speak on the subject if the pro-Gaga fans had been permit-
ted access.
Most subjects of popular discussion, from Lady Gaga and Harry
Potter to abortion and the economy, are, by definition, secular topics.
They are subjects of the world, not limited to the concern of any
homogenous group or sect.13' Consequently, under the requirement
128 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829-30
(1995).
129 See Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 783 (Williams, J., dissenting) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).
130 See id. at 777-78 (majority opinion).
131 See Secular Definition, WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DicTIONARY 1296
(Michael Agnes & David B. Guralnik eds., 4th ed. 2010) (defining secular as "of or
relating to worldly things as distinguished from things relating to church and
religion").
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of viewpoint neutrality, a school that provided access to a pro-choice
group would need to permit a pro-life religious group equal access to
its facilities. This is logically and legally correct-despite how relig-
iously motivated that group's anti-abortion sentiments may be-
because abortion is a secular topic. It pertains to all, and the state
cannot give preference to some views on the topic over others, regard-
less of the religious or nonreligious inclination of the speaker.
Despite the wide umbrella of speech that can be considered secu-
lar, not all of a religious group's speech fits under this rubric. Relig-
ious exercise and worship seems, at least on the surface, quite distinct
from other types of religious speech.132 While there are secular alter-
natives to most topics of concern to religious groups-there are obvi-
ously secular reasons why one could be against abortion, the death
penalty, war, etc.-there is no truly secular version of, for instance, a
Catholic mass. Religious exercise and worship obviously involve
speech but are quite different from most speech, as they do not com-
ment on secular subjects but are inherently self-referential. Religious
speech given at a religious ceremony may, of course, comment on
matters of secular concern. This is quite common, for instance, in
most Catholic homilies, where the priest will apply the lesson of the
particular Gospel reading to modern issues pertaining to daily life.
Nevertheless, the primary focus of a Catholic mass remains on the ide-
als and commands of the religion itself. Therefore, given that there is
no secular alternative to this type of religious speech (hereinafter
referred to as "religious speech," as opposed to "speech from a relig-
ious perspective"), the normal rules of viewpoint discrimination do
not logically, and should not legally, apply. Accordingly, religious
speech should be considered its own separate category of content, and
a state-and by extension a public university-should be able to
exclude that speech from a limited public forum it has created. Judge
Williams applied this framework to the religious activities that the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin refused to fund, and she properly determined
that as "there is no equivalent secular speech funded," an exclusion of
"purely religious activities is a categorical, neutral exclusion."13 3
The text of the First Amendment provides justification for this
distinction as well. As Judge Williams described, if the Free Speech
Clause protected all religious activity, then the Free Exercise Clause
132 Religious proselytizing would not be included under this label of exercise and
worship because any person may speak of the perceived positive or negative qualities
associated with a particular religion. Proselytizers merely speak-from a quite subjec-
tive perspective, of course-on a topic that is open to all for comment and criticism.
133 Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 786 (Williams, J., dissenting).
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would be rendered superfluous. 1 3 4 Such a reading would violate the
canon of statutory interpretation instructing not to interpret a textual
provision in such a way that will render another provision meaning-
less.13 5 Given the First Amendment provides for the freedom of both
religious exercise and speech, it is sensible to presume that the fram-
ers contemplated that at least some "speech" by religious actors was
not covered by the Free Speech Clause.
Not only is this result a clear interpretation of the constitutional
text, it also respects the special status religion is afforded in our soci-
ety. As Judge Williams's dissent acknowledges, the Badger Catholic
panel's conclusion that "purely religious activities ... cannot be mean-
ingfully distinguished from the categories of dialog, discussion or
debate from a religious perspective," is one that "degrades religion
and the practice of religion."136 Defending religious freedom under
the umbrella of the Free Speech Clause is a specious defense, because
equating religious practice with all other areas of human experience
fails to recognize the important role religion has played in our society
and legal tradition. Thus, drawing a valid line separating religious
speech from speech from a religious perspective is justified on three
grounds. It is the logical extension of the distinction between view-
point and content discrimination, follows the textual command of the
First Amendment, and respects the wholly unique standing given to
religious practice by American law and culture.
The last necessary step in Judge Williams's content-discrimination
analysis required a finding that the university's exclusion of Badger
Catholic's activities constituting "purely religious practice" was reason-
able in light of the university's purpose in creating its limited public
forum.13 7 The dissent surmised that it was reasonable, given the lim-
ited funding available, for the university to refuse to directly subsidize
such religious speech and practice.13 8 Having met this low bar for
content exclusion, Judge Williams concluded that the decision not to
fund purely religious speech was constitutional.139
134 See id. at 785 ("If religion, and the practice of one's religion, can be described
as merely dialog or debate from a religious perspective, what work does the Free Exer-
cise clause of the First Amendment do?").
135 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) ("It cannot be
presumed that any clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and
therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.").
136 Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 785 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137 See id. at 789-90.
138 See id.
139 Id.
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IV. A SENSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE STANDARD
FOR PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES
Public universities generally offer two types of support to student
groups: monetary subsidies and access to campus facilities. Despite
the Rosenberger Court's suggestion that the same rules apply to both
types of benefits, Martinez's divergent treatment of financial support
as compared to facility access suggests that different legal standards
should govern their validity.
A. Funding: Why Money Is Different
While Martinez did not explicitly overturn Rosenberger, it under-
mined its presumption that there is no constitutional difference
between a university's grant of access to facilities and its provision of
monetary support. The Martinez Court suggested that a university
may extend one type of benefit to a religious group-physical
access-while withholding another type-a monetary benefit. Of
course, a school may not do so arbitrarily on the basis of the religious
inclination of the student group alone, as that would constitute text-
book viewpoint discrimination. However, following Martinez, if a pub-
lic university extends access to all groups, the school constitutionally
may then condition the procurement of monetary support on comply-
ing with an antidiscrimination policy. This result rings true even
where the policy places a disparate burden on religious groups seek-
ing to restrict club membership along sectarian lines. While Justice
Alito's Martinez dissent argued that Hastings's policy unduly burdened
CLS's constitutional right of expressive association, 140 the members of
CLS are not hampered from associating with those that they choose.
Rather, Hastings is only burdening their ability to do so on university
property. 41
140 See Christian Legal Soc'y v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 3010 (2010) (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
141 Professor Eugene Volokh, in a prescient essay written four years before Marti-
nez, described the legal ramifications of CLS's discriminating in membership at public
universities. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom ofExpressive Association and Government Subsi-
dies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919 (2006). Professor Volokh described how private actors
have the constitutional right to associate, and not to associate, with whomever they
desire. See id. at 1920. Despite the existence of this private right, however, the gov-
ernment has no duty to "subsidize the exercise of constitutional rights, even when it
subsidizes other analogous behavior." Id. at 1924.
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B. Facility Access: Why the Establishment Clause Requires
More than Mere Neutrality
Given the special status Martinez afforded financial support of
religious student groups, the bar to access to school facilities appears
lower than that to a monetary subsidy. Widmar made clear that a pub-
lic university could not deny religious groups access merely because
the group would use the facilities for religious worship and discus-
sion. 142 Nevertheless, given that the Establishment Clause supposes
that permissible state support of religious institutions is not unlimited,
it logically follows that public universities may not grant boundless
access to religious groups looking to practice religion in a wholly
unconstrained way.143 To phrase the issue more succinctly, it seems
apparent that if the college in Widmar or the school district in Lamb's
Chapel allowed a Catholic group to indefinitely rent a public space and
convert it into a church, that action would violate the Establishment
Clause. Such conduct is, literally, a physical establishment of religion.
The question then becomes, when does a student group's activity so
resemble the establishment of a church, or an analogous religious
institution, that a university may not constitutionally allow it to do so
on public property?
The Supreme Court's modern trend towards viewing the Estab-
lishment Clause as requiring governmental neutrality to religion, as
exemplified by Rosenberger and Good News Club, diverges from the prin-
ciples emanating the Lemon standard. While the Court's more con-
servative Justices have criticized Lemon,144 it is still valid law. 145 The
Lemon test's three prongs correspond to the three evils against which
the Establishment Clause defends: state "sponsorship, financial sup-
port, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."146
142 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981).
143 While a student group's religious practice would constitute private, not govern-
ment, conduct, the Establishment Clause would still be implicated, as the university,
and by extension the State, is actively "managing" the conduct. See Caplan, supra note
52, at 650 (discussing the Court's general rule that "the government is constrained by
the Constitution even when it performs managerial functions").
144 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (char-
acterizing Lemon as a "reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not derived from,
but positively conflict with, our long-accepted constitutional traditions," and counting
various concurring and dissenting opinions criticizing the Lemon standard).
145 The Lemon test has never been overturned. Further, in the first twenty-one
years following Lemon, the Court decided thirty-one Establishment Clause cases, and
applied the Lemon test in all but one. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 603 n.4 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
146 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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The test's second prong, mandating that the relevant state statute's
primary effect neither advance nor inhibit religion, does square with
the understanding of the Establishment Clause as a vehicle for govern-
mental neutrality. However, each of the other two prongs of Lemon-
that the legislation have a secular purpose and that the policy does
not excessively entangle the State with religion-are inspired by more
than benign impartiality towards religion. Rather, Lemon is propelled
by the notion that there is a limit to how much the government
should involve itself with any religious institution, no matter how even-
handedly it acts.14 7 The secular purpose prong is particularly telling.
The requirement is not that a law be passed with both a secular pur-
pose and a religious one, or even that the purpose be mostly secular.
By mandating that all state acts have a wholly secular purpose, Lemon
makes clear that the government should act without regard to relig-
ion, rather than attempt to balance both secular and religious
concerns.
Additionally, the constitutional text itself furthers the contention
that the Establishment Clause requires more than mere neutrality
towards religion. The First Amendment commands that Congress
and, given incorporation, the States, "shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion."1 48 The text does not refer to any balancing
of interests, nor of even-handedness, but rather it supposes a com-
plete, unequivocal prohibition.
Recall the village hypothetical from the Introduction. There it
was clear, both intuitively and as a matter of constitutional law, the
mayor could not use public money to create three places of worship.
This conclusion was valid even where the mayor acted neutrally
towards religion-both amongst the religious faiths themselves and,
more generally, between religion and nonreligion. The fallacy inher-
ent to the neutrality approach thus becomes apparent, as the First
Amendment embodies a presumption that there are limits to how far
a state actor may provide support for religion. 1 4 9 It seems relatively
147 See LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 31-32 (2d ed. 1994)
(describing the understanding that, when the Constitution was adopted, it was not
understood to embody a nonpreferential view of religious accommodation-i.e., the
Establishment Clause was not intended to merely bar government from favoring one
religion over another, but rather to preclude government entanglement more
generally).
148 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
149 See Arlen Specter, Defending the Wall: Maintaining Church/State Separation in
America, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 575, 579-82 (1995) (recounting the strong histor-
ical evidence in favor of interpreting the Establishment Clause as requiring the sepa-
ration of church and state); cf Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion
Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 505, 520 (1998) (describing how the modern
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undisputed that a state university may not create a church or allow a
student group to convert its facilities into a church.15 0 The remaining
task is determining what religious speech and conduct is so similar to
such creation or conversion that a state university violates the Estab-
lishment Clause when it permits it in public facilities.
Whether the line is drawn at speech that is wholly "religious in
character," as the University of Wisconsin proposed in Badger Catho-
lic,15 1 or at "purely religious practices," as asserted by Judge Williams's
dissent,'52 some line needs to be drawn between permissible and
impermissible religious conduct that a state university may support in
light of the Establishment Clause. Where to draw that line, of course,
is precisely the problem that has proven so vexing forjudges.'15 Both
the majority and dissent in Badger Catholic opine on the difficulty of
distinguishing speech informed by a religious viewpoint from speech
that is fundamentally religious.15 4 Furthermore, such line-drawing
not only presents the problem of institutional competency for the
judiciary, but it also poses a constitutional quandary for state actors
looking to identify, on their own, speech from a religious perspective
as opposed to pure religious exercise.155 One of the central premises
behind the Religion Clauses, if not the central premise, is that there is
Court's neutrality doctrine requires facial neutrality but often permits the endorse-
ment and subsidization of mainstream, i.e., Christian, religions at the expense of
minority religions).
150 Justice Souter's dissent in Good News Club makes such a point. "If the majority's
statement ignores reality, as it surely does, then today's holding may be understood
only in equally generic terms. Otherwise, indeed, this case would stand for the
remarkable proposition that any public school opened for civic meetings must be
opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque." Good News Club v. Milford
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 139 (2001) (Souter,J., dissenting).
151 See Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2010).
152 See id. at 789 (Williams, J., dissenting).
153 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981) ("[I t is highly doubt-
ful that [a principled line distinguishing speech from a religious perspective from
religious worship] would lie within the judicial competence to administer.").
154 See Badger Catholic, Inc., 620 F.3d at 781 (majority opinion) (describing the
particular difficulty in crafting such a distinction for certain religious groups-such as
Quakers, Muslims, and Buddhists-whose religion does not conceive of a separation
between religious worship and daily life); id. at 789 (Williams, J., dissenting) (admit-
ting that there are an "endless number of perspectives" regarding how to determine
what constitutes "purely religious practices").
155 See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70 n.6 ("[T]o draw the distinction would require
the university ... to inquire into the significance of words and practices to different
religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same faith. Such inquiries would
tend inevitably to entangle the State with religion in a manner forbidden by our
cases.").
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a limit to state involvement with religious institutions.156 If a state
entity, such as a university, were to entangle itself too closely with
religious student groups and their religious exercises, this would
undermine the separation doctrine generally, as well as Lemon's warn-
ing against "excessive government entanglement" with religion.15 7
Nonetheless, the fact that line drawing may be difficult is not a
sufficient argument against it, as judges are the actors whose role nec-
essarily requires constitutional line drawing in tough cases.1 58 And,
while there is merit to the excessive entanglement argument where
state officers and agencies are directly overseeing religious practices,
this concern does not apply wholly to the judiciary, which merely has
the power of decision over litigated cases and controversies.'5 9 Thus,
the Court should no longer avoid, but rather attempt to resolve, the
constitutional question presented here.
Lamb's Chapel presented two significant dichotomies: viewpoint
versus content discrimination, and the protections offered by the Free
Speech Clause versus those by the Free Exercise Clause. These dichot-
omies provide a sufficient framework for thinking about what sepa-
rates speech from a religious viewpoint from purely religious
156 See John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine Wall of Separation, 101 MIcH. L. REV. 1869,
1889-91 (2003) (describing a number of rationale for the separation of church and
state, including the protection of the church from state control and the insulation of
government from religious orthodoxy).
157 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (describing how close
scrutiny of public, nonreligious instruction given in sectarian schools, so to make sure
that the instruction given was not religious, was too excessive an "entanglement" for
Lemon purposes), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1997)(rejecting Aguilar's premise that public school teachers need to be supervised in a
sectarian setting, but not the basic understanding that scrutiny of too close a charac-
ter would constitute excessive entanglement with religion).
158 See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24(1978) (declaring that, because "[t]he question of what constitutes a 'taking' for pur-
poses of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty,"
and no judicial "set formula" was available, reviewing courts must make ad hoc, case-
by-case determinations); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972) (describing
how the difficulty of ascertaining the scope of a criminal defendant's right to a speedy
trial necessitates that "any inquiry into a speedy trial claim necessitates a functional
analysis of the right in the particular context of the case").
159 But see John Tyler, Comment, Is Worship a Unique Subject or a Way ofApproaching
Many Different Subjects? Two Recent Decisions That Attempt to Answer This Question Set the
Second and Ninth Circuits on a Course Toward State Entanglement with Religion, 59 MERCER
L. REV. 1319, 1364 (2008) (arguing that attempts by district courts to ascertain
whether or not a religious practice constituted worship would lead to "inquiries that
penetrate so deeply into the intimate details of religious practice that an Establish-
ment Clause violation seems unavoidable").
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speech.o60 If speech on a secular topic is protected by the Free
Speech Clause, then the Free Exercise Clause logically protects con-
duct regarding religious, nonsecular topics. However, such a category
should be smaller than the broad class of activities that may be consid-
ered "worship," for two reasons. First, Widmar held that the govern-
ment may not exclude individuals from a forum solely because their
activity there constituted worship. 6 1 Secondly, a broad reading of
"worship" may encompass a great number of religious practices.
While a more limited reading could confine the term to referring only
to formal or ceremonial exercises of devotion, the word can also be
thought to encompass all offerings of thanks and gratitude to a divine
figure, whether formal or not.1 6 2 One can easily imagine a religious
student group incorporating prayer and bible verses into meetings
where the group discusses other secular topics as well. To attempt to
limit such instances of religiosity is neither constitutionally nor nor-
matively attractive. Accordingly, the class of religious conduct the
Establishment Clause forbids at public universities should be far nar-
rower in scope than the broad category of worship.
The three categories of religious speech described in Justice Ste-
vens's dissent in Good News Club do not provide an adequate frame-
work for resolving this problem. Justice Stevens's three categories-
speech from a religious viewpoint, worship, and proselytizing-are
theoretically distinct, but as already discussed, mere worship is not,
and should not, be barred at public university facilities. Furthermore,
proselytizing can be viewed as a category of the first type of speech,
albeit from a viewpoint that is clearly not impartial.
A better standard may be gleaned from another look at the Cath-
olic mass. In a typical mass, the homily follows the liturgical and gos-
160 The exclusion of speech made from a religious viewpoint on the basis of that
viewpoint would, naturally, constitute textbook viewpoint discrimination. Excluding
religious exercise, on the other hand, would be permissible content discrimination.
See Caplan, supra note 52, at 651-52 (including, under permissible instances of con-
tent discrimination in nonpublic forums, "a rule disallowing the rental of public
library conference rooms for religious services" (citing Faith Ctr. Church Evangelical
Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908 (9th Cir. 2007))).
161 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981).
162 See Worship Definition, NEW OxFon AMERICAN DICrIONARY 1993 (Angus Steven-
son & Christine A. Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010) (defining worship as both "the feeling
or expression of reverence and adoration for a deity" and "the acts or rites that make
up a formal expression of reverence for a deity"). Not many reasonable people would
contend that personal prayer and reflection, performed in the solitude of one's own
home, did not constitute a form of worship. Thus, "[c]haracterizing worship as any
one thing is a fool's errand." Richard Esenberg, Of Speeches and Sermons: Worship in
Limited Purpose Public Forums, 78 Miss. L.J. 453, 499 (2009).
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pel readings, and it allows the priest or deacon to apply the lessons of
the religious text to everyday life.163 One could readily describe the
Catholic homily as typical speech on a secular topic from a religious
viewpoint. However, no reasonable person would assert that the
entire Catholic mass, considered in its totality, is such speech. It
would, seemingly, be "pure" religious speech and conduct, protected
by the Free Exercise Clause, rather than the Free Speech Clause.
Consequently, the proper test for determining when religious conduct
moves beyond mere speech from a religious viewpoint should con-
sider the underlying religious conduct in its entirety.
Thus, a possible test emerges: Where religious conduct, in its
totality, consists of formal religious ritual or exercise, it becomes relig-
ious conduct a state university may not directly facilitate on campus.
While it may be difficult to make a totality-of-the-circumstances deter-
mination in the context of unstructured, free-form religious activities,
it is unlikely that such activities would even qualify under this stan-
dard. Rather, the standard will most likely catch the class of religious
conduct-structured religious ceremony-that the test is intended to
cover.
Concentrating on the category of formal religious exercise has at
least two advantages over focusing on the broad class of activities that
may constitute "worship." First, university administrators can much
more easily observe formal religious exercises and ritual than they can
informal sessions of worship. Limiting the standard to "formal" relig-
ious exercises thus prevents university officials from becoming too
entangled, to use the phraseology of Lemon, in students' religious
activities. Secondly, the occurrence of formal religious ritual taking
place in campus facilities is much more likely to cultivate the impres-
sion that such rituals carry the imprimatur of the university,1 64 espe-
cially compared to more informal meetings of prayer and religious
discussion.
163 See ALFRED MCBRIDE, A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MASs 48 (2006) (describing the
rise of the homily in the Roman Catholic tradition as a response to the understanding
that "explanations of Scripture were needed and pastoral applications of the Word of
God were paramount").
164 The concern that religious exercise may be considered to be endorsed by the
school evokes the so-called 'endorsement test' for the Establishment Clause. See
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (positing
that the government violates the Establishment Clause when it endorses religion, as
such endorsement "sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community"); see also Winn, supra note 79, at 633 (describing
how, "even absent state financial aid, the symbolic weight of state approval has sup-
ported a finding of primary effect" under the Lemon test).
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The next point to consider is to what extent religious activities,
considered in their aggregate, must contain instances of formal relig-
ious exercise in order to fall under this standard. Given both the
tough factual determinations inherent to these types of cases and the
desire not to disturb students' religious freedom, the proposed test
should not be applied pursuant to a standard akin to the "preponder-
ance of the evidence" test. In a close case, where the Court believes
the contested religious activity is near equal parts speech on a secular
topic and formal religious exercise, that activity should be permissible
at public universities. Either the rigid "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard, or the intermediate "clear and convincing evidence" stan-
dard, is more appropriate. The incorporation of one of these higher
standards respects the religious freedom of university students to pray
or worship in their own way, while simultaneously allowing public uni-
versities, when presented with clear instances of formal religious exer-
cise, to follow the dictates of the Establishment Clause.
Whether the religious periodical in Rosenberger or the sectarian
instruction in Good News Club would meet this standard is, of course, a
difficult question, depending on the entire factual record before the
Court. Nevertheless, forcing the Court to consider whether the total-
ity of the activities at issue rises -to the level of formal religious exercise
would ameliorate at least one flawed facet of this area of the law. The
proposed standard would discourage accommodation-minded judges,
attempting to uphold all religious exercise at public schools, from mis-
characterizing all religious practice, instruction, and proselytizing as
mere speech from a religious perspective. The line in any particular
case may be quite hard to see, but, as Justice Stevens wrote in his dis-
sent in Good News Club, "[t]he line between the various categories of
religious speech may be difficult to draw, but I think that the distinc-
tions are valid, and that a school . . . must be permitted to draw
them."165
C. Resolving the Badger Catholic Dilemma
Neither of the standards previously described regarding mone-
tary support and facility access apply directly to Badger Catholic. There,
the student group did not participate in discriminatory practices when
admitting members, and it also was not seeking the mere use of facili-
ties for religious exercises. Instead, Badger Catholic sought monetary
subsidies for religious activities that the school decided were not
speech from a religious viewpoint, but instead were more "religious in
165 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 133 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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character."1 6 6 Therefore, seemingly, the standards announced in
Parts IV.A and IV.B appear, on the surface, to be unavailing.
However, there is no need to fashion a third standard for situa-
tions where a student group is seeking financial support from a uni-
versity for activities constituting formal religious exercise. For, if the
group's conduct does not meet the Part IV.B standard of permissible
religious activity in public university facilities, it should not qualify for
a state subsidy for such activities. This is the logical conclusion from
Martinez's implicit assertion that the bar to a state financial benefit is
higher than that for access to state facilities. Therefore, whatever the
standard is for university financial support for student groups, the uni-
versity should not be bound to meet a heightened standard of proof
when denying a group's application for monetary aid. Here, some-
thing akin to the "preponderance of the evidence" standard would be
more appropriate. If a public university finds that a group's religious
activity contains more formal religious exercise than speech from a
religious perspective, the school would be justified in refusing to subsi-
dize such an activity.
If the Supreme Court were to adopt such a standard in deciding
Badger Catholic or an analogous case, the proper response would be to
vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The lower court would
then be obliged to consider whether the contested activities-in
Badger Catholic, the spiritual appointments and the summer retreat-
were, in their entirety, more akin to pure religious exercise or to
speech on a secular topic from a religious viewpoint. If the reviewing
court were to arrive at the former conclusion, it would then be com-
pelled to uphold the university's decision not to subsidize predomi-
nantly religious activities.
CONCLUSION
Today, the dual commands of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses may seem contradictory. 167 The Free Exercise Clause guaran-
tees that the government will have no say in how one practices her
religion, while the Establishment Clause prevents the government
from promoting any religion. However, given the reality of the mod-
ern regulatory state, where government agencies touch many, if not
166 Badger Catholic, Inc. v. Walsh, 620 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 2010).
167 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 79, at 18 (describing how embracing both
Religion Clauses leads to the "curious position that requires government both to
grant religion special privileges and to impose upon it special restrictions").
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most, facets of life, 168 it becomes increasingly difficult to find
instances where personal religious practice is completely divorced
from any government regulation. This is especially true at the mod-
ern public university. For four years, thousands of students spend the
vast majority of their lives in and around college campuses, which are
under the exclusive dominion of the university, and by extension, the
state. Fashioning a legal standard to govern religion at such institu-
tions is therefore both conceptually difficult and constitutionally
critical.
The standard proposed by this Note attempts to thread this con-
stitutional needle. There is no denying that religion plays a vitally
important role in American society, and that state actors, such as uni-
versities, and the courts should give wide latitude to individuals to
practice their religion without inhibition. However, one must not fail
to appreciate that in most Establishment Clause cases, the question is
not whether the government is inhibiting an individual's religious
freedom, but rather whether that individual or group is impermissibly
donning the auspices of the state while it practices its religion.
Prohibiting public facilities from being used as forums for formal
religious exercise and ritual does not inhibit the personal practice of
one's own religion. Rather, such a proscription serves as a recogni-
tion that the government, under the Establishment Clause, is under
an affirmative duty to avoid the direct sponsorship of religion-noth-
ing more, and nothing less.
168 See Michael E. Parrish, The Great Depression, The New Deal, and the American Legal
Order, 59 WASH. L. REv. 723, 725-27 (1984).
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